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While advocating minimal judicial interference in matters of public
education, the Ingraham Court has not set forth adequate guidelines to aid
the lower federal courts in determining how much interference is justified.
Mary Lynn Bingham

LABOR LAW

- LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT MEETING ATTENDANCE REQUIREMENT FOR CANDIDATES FOR UNION
OFFICE FOUND INVALID.

Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America v. Usery
(U.S. 1977)

Local 3489 of the United Steelworkers of America (Local)1 conducted an
election of officers on June 22, 1970 in accordance with the candidacy
requirements prescribed by the constitution of the parent International
Union. 2 The constitution required, inter alia, that a prospective candidate
for local union office attend 50% of the regular monthly meetings held in the
three years preceding nominations unless union activities or working hours
prevented attendance. 3 Following the election, and after exhausting internal
union remedies, one of the two defeated candidates for president of the Local
filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor4 (Secretary) asserting that the
meeting attendance rule was unreasonable. 5 Thereafter the Secretary
1. Local 3489 was the original party to this action. Brennan v. Local 3489,
United Steelworkers of America, 520 F.2d 516, 517 n.1 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd sub noma.

Wirtz v. Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America, 429 U.S. 305 (1977).

Subsequently, the parent International, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO,
intervened as an additional defendant. 520 F.2d at 517 n.1. The Local was composed
entirely of production and maintenance employees of the Stran Steel Corporation
plant in Terre Haute, Indiana. Id. at 517.
2. 520 F.2d at 518. The Union constitution provided in pertinent part:
No member shall be eligible for election as a Local Union officer or Grievance
Committeeman unless ....

he has attended at least one-half ('/2) of the regular

meetings of his Local Union for thirty-six (36) months previous to the June, 1970,
election, unless his Union activities or working hours prevented his attendance.
International Const., United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, art. VII, §9(c).
3. 520 F.2d at 518. The constitution also required a prospective candidate to be a
member in good standing for 24 months immediately preceding the election and to be
employed in a place within the jurisdiction of the Local. Id. at 517.
4. Id. at 518. Section 402(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA) provides in pertinent part:
A member of a labor organization(1) who has exhausted the remedies available under the construction and
bylaws of such organization and of any parent body, or
(2) who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision
within three calendar months after their invocation, may file a complaint with
the Secretary within one calendar month thereafter alleging the violation of any
provision of section 481 of this title ....

29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1970). The LMRDA, id. §§ 401-531 (1970), is popularly known as the
Landrum-Griffin Act.
Peter Brennan was the Secretary of Labor at the time this suit was instituted.
520,F.2d at 516.
5. Id. at 518.
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instituted an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under section 402(b) of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 19596 (LMRDA)
seeking to set aside the 1970 election.' The Secretary's complaint alleged,
inter alia,5 that the election was void because the Local had imposed an
unreasonable candidacy qualification in violation of section 401(e) of the
LMRDA. 9
The district court upheld the Local's meeting attendance rule as
reasonable under section 401(e) and dismissed the complaint.' 0 On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding
that the meeting requirement, which rendered 96% of the Local membership
ineligible for office and required potential candidates to plan their
candidacies as early as eighteen months in advance of the election," was
6. 29 U.S.C. §482(b) (1970).
7. 520 F.2d at 517. Section 402(b) of the LMRDA provides in pertinent part:
The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to
believe that a violation . . .has occurred and has not been remedied, he shall
... bring a civil action against the labor organization . . . to set aside the

invalid election, if any, and to direct the conduct of an election . . .under the
supervision of the Secretary ....
29 U.S.C. §482(b) (1970).
8. The Secretary's complaint also alleged that the Local had failed to elect its
officers by secret ballot, as required by § 401(b) of the LMRDA. 520 F.2d at 517.

Although the Seventh Circuit found that this section had been violated, id. at 522, this
issue was not appealed to the Supreme Court.

9. Id. at 517. Section 401(e) provides in pertinent part:
In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot a
reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and
every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold
office (subject to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications
uniformly imposed) and shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the

candidate or candidates of his choice, without being subject to penalty,
discipline, or improper interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization
or any member thereof .... The election shall be conducted in accordance with
the constitution and by laws of such organization insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970) (emphasis added). Section 504 of the LMDRA is not at issue
in the instant case. Generally, this section prohibits members of the Communist Party
from holding union office. Id. § 504 (1970). The Supreme Court held unconstitutional,
as a bill of attainder, the provision of § 504 which imposes criminal liability on
Communist Party members for holding union office. See United States v. Brown, 381

U.S. 437 (1965).
10. 520 F.2d at 518. The district court filed an unreported memorandum opinion in
which it concluded that the meeting attendance rule was a reasonable qualification
within the meaning of § 401(e) of the LMRDA. Id. For the text of § 401(e), see note 9
supra. In its opinion, the district court stated: "The meeting attendance qualification
...is designed to (1) insure that candidates have demonstrated an interest in union
affairs prior to election and are therefore likely to continue to do so, if elected, and (2)
that candidates will, if elected, be able to more knowledgeably fulfill their duties." 520
F.2d at 518, quoting Brennan v. Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America, No.
TH70-C-117 (S.D. Ind. April 30, 1974).
11. 520 F.2d at 519. Only 23 members of the 660-person Local qualified as
candidates. Id. Since meetings were held monthly, the rule's three year requirement
meant that prospective candidates had to plan their candidacies at least 18 months in
advance of the election in order to acquire the necessary 18 attendance credits. Id. at
520. The need for a prospective candidate to plan his campaign 18 months before the
election was determined to favor incumbents. Id. The court distinguished the effect of
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not a reasonable qualification under section 401(e). 12 The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the Local's candidacy rule could not be considered a
reasonable qualification under section 401(e) because it had a substantial
antidemocratic effect on the Local's election by sharply restricting the
openness of the electoral process. Local 3489, United Steelworkers of
America v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
In enacting the LMRDA, Congress sought to strengthen union
democracy

13

without unnecessary

intervention

in

internal

union

af-

a two year, 50% rule from that of the Local's three-year, 50% rule by reasoning that
"since the three-year rule can be 50% harsher as to the number of meetings which a
member must attend to qualify for office and as to the time limitations imposed on his
decision to seek office, the reasonableness of the two-year rule does not determine the
reasonableness of the three-year rule." Id. at 521. Moreover, the court found that of the
23 eligible members, ten were incumbent officeholders. Id. at 518. Since the LMRDA
"was intended to curb the possibility of abuse by an entrenched leadership, whether
benevolent or not, a restriction that resulted in almost half of those eligible to be
candidates in a local of this size also being incumbent officeholders is surely suspect."
Id. at 519-20 (footnotes omitted).
12. Id. at 521. The court ordered a new election to be held under the supervision of
the Secretary. Id. at 522-23. Section 402(c) of the LMRDA authorizes any district court
finding "that the violation of § 481 [section 401(e) of the LMRDA] of this title may
have affected the outcome of an election" to declare the election void and "direct the
conduct of a new election under supervision of the Secretary .

. . ."

29 U.S.C. § 482(c)

(1970). The Seventh Circuit noted that "[w]e need not decide whether the 18 of 36 rule
is per se unreasonable because its effect of severely restricting the number of potential
candidates for union office sho.s it to be clearly unreasonable in this case." 520 F.2d
at 519. Nevertheless, the court !appeared to adopt a per se method of analysis when it
later observed that "if a very high percentage of the membership is disqualified from
seeking office by a rule, as was the situation here, that fact alone may justify a
finding that the rule is unreasonable." Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
13. Barnard, Restrictions 6n the Right to be a Candidate and Hold Union Office
- The "Reasonable Qualifications" Exception in the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act, 18 WAYNEL. REV. 1239 (1972). See H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6-7, 15-16 (1959) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 741], reprinted in I NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT

OF 1959, at 764-65, 773-74 (1959) [hereinafter cited as I NLRB LEGIS. HIST.]; S. REP.
No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, 20 (1959) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 187],
reprinted in I NLRB LEGIS. HIST., supra at 402-03, 416. See generally R. SLOVENKO,
SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF

1959,

475-94 (1961).
A brief overview of the first four titles of the LMRDA demonstrates the broad
sweep of the statute. Title I sets forth a "Bill of Rights" for union members and
provides for private enforcement of those rights. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1970). Title II
requires public disclosure of the organization of financing of unions and those who do
business with them. Id. §§ 531-541 (1970). Title III is designed to protect subsidiary
unions from dominance by parent bodies. Id. §§ 461-466 (1970). Title IV seeks to
insure a responsive, democratically elected union leadership. Id. §§ 481-484 (1970).
There is a significant difference between the enforcement mechanisms provided for in
Titles I and IV. Title I is enforced by civil actions brought by union members alleging
violation of their rights. Id. § 412 (1970). Under Title IV, only the Secretary of Labor
can file an enforcement suit if he finds probable cause to support a member's
complaint. Id. § 482(a), (b) (1970). For a discussion of the complex relationship between
Title I and Title IV rights, see Comment, Pre-ElectionRemedies Under the LandrumGriffin Act: The "Twilight Zone" Between Election Rights Under Title IV and the
Guaranteesof Titles I and V, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1105 (1974); Note, Titles I& IV of the
LMRDA: A Resolution of the Conflict of Remedies, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 166 (1974). The
Supreme Court has attempted to resolve the conflict concerning the relationship of
Titles I and IV by mandating that all election disputes over union offices be resolved
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fairs. 4 Democratization of labor organizations was considered essential not
only as a matter of political principle, but also as a means of maintaining industrial peace and stability. 15 Consistent with this objective, Congress resolved
that honest unionism and the public interest could best be served by guaranteeing union members a fair opportunity to select, their leadership through
free elections. 16 Section 401(e) of the LMRDA embodied this guarantee by
exclusively through the enforcement mechanisms of Title IV. See Calhoon v. Harvey,
379 U.S. 134 (1964).
For an excellent discussion of the LMRDA's legislative history, see Aaron,
The Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851
(1960); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58
MICH. L. REV. 819 (1960); Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 GEO. L.J.
226 (1959).
14. See note 18 and accompanying text infra.
15. The principle of forcing unions to function democratically was expressed by
Senator McClellan in practical terms when he commented that "racketeering,
corruption, abuse of power, and other practices on the part of some labor
organizations [could not] be prevented until and unless the Congress . . . [had] the

wisdom and the courage to enact laws prescribing minimum standards of democratic
process and conduct for the administration of internal union affairs." 105 CONG. REC.

6471 (1959) (remarks of Senator McClellan). See Rothman, Legislative History of the
"Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MINN. L. REV. 199 (1960). See H.R. REP. No.
741, supra note 13, at 6-7, reprinted in I NLRB LEGIs. HIST., supra note 13, at 764-65.
There was little congressional disagreement with the view that democratic
procedures were appropriate to labor organizations. In its report on the LMRDA, the

Senate Labor Committee expressed the consensus view:

It is plain that the trade union movement in the United States is facing difficult
internal problems and - because of these internal problems - tensions with the
surrounding community. . . . In some cases the structure and procedures

necessary for trade unions while they were struggling for survival are ill-adapted
to their new role and to changed conditions; they are not always conducive to
efficient, honest, and democratic practices.

S. REP. No. 187, supra note 13, at 5-6, reprinted in I NLRB LEGIs. HIST., supra note
13, at 401-02 (emphasis added).
The ideological and practical utility of subjecting unions to evolving concepts
of democratic conduct has continued to provoke heated controversy among
academicians in the labor field long after the enactment of the LMRDA. One view
posits that the relationship between labor and management is one of economic
warfare. A. Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL POLICY 93-94 (1960). Consequently, the
quality of a union's "democracy" can only be measured "insofar as it represents the
interests of its members - regardless of the nature of its internal government or its
responsiveness to its membership." Berchem, Labor Democracy in America: The
Impact of Titles I & IV of the Landrum-GriffinAct, 13 VILL. L. REV. 1, n.7 (1967). See
also H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-20 (1947); 1 ACLU, DEMOCRACY IN
TRADE UNIONS 1 (1943). The opposing view reflects a more idealistic inclination: "An
individual worker gains no human rights by substituting an autocratic union
officialdom for the tyranny of the boss. Only a democratic union, sensitive to the
rights of minorities, can help men achieve the ideals of individual responsibility,
equality of opportunity, and self-determination." Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving
Union Democracy, 71 HARV. L. REV. 609, 610 (1959). But see W. WIRTZ, LABOR AND
THE Public INTEREST 85 (1964). One particularly provocative view denies the need for
"democracy" in labor unions because their function has been reduced to that of a
routine bureaucracy whose only goal is to operate efficiently. See C. KERR, LABOR AND
MANAGEMENT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 29 (1964).
16. See Beaird, Union Officer Provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 51 VA. L. REV. 1306, 1307 (1965). See also note 13 supra.
The Labor Committees of both the House of Representatives and the Senate reported
out identical language in their legislative recommendations:
It needs no argument to demonstrate the importance of free and democratic
union elections. Under the National Labor Relations and Railway Labor Acts
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establishing the right of every union member to run for office.' 7 Congress
also reflected the balance between federal intervention and union selfgovernment," however, by providing that unions could circumscribe this
right by "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed."' 9 Congressional
refusal to legislate a standard of reasonableness burdened the courts with
°
the task of determining the scope of the qualifications clause
the union which is the bargaining representative has power, in conjunction with
the employer, to fix a man's wages, hours and conditions of employment ....
The Government which gives unions this power has an obligation to insure that
the officials who wield it are responsive to the desires of the men and women
they represent. The best assurance which can be given is a legal guarantee of
free and periodic elections ....
S. REP. No. 187, supra note 13, at 20, reprintedin I NLRB LEGIs. HIST., supra note 13,

at 416; H.R. REP. No. 741, supra note 13, at 15-16, reprinted in I NLRB LEGIS. HIST.,
supra note 13, at 773-74.
17. For the text of §401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 48 1(e) (1970), see note 9 supra.
18. In reporting the bill, the Senate Labor Committee strongly opposed "any
attempt to prescribe detailed procedures and standards for the conduct of union
business." S. REP. No. 187, supra note 13, at 7, reprinted in I NLRB LEGIs. HIST.,
supra note 13, at 403. The concern for maximizing union self-government was
summarized as follows:
The committee recognized the desirability of minimum interference by Government in the internal affairs of any private organization. Trade unions have made
a commendable effort to correct internal abuses; hence the committee believes
that only essential standards should be imposed by legislation. Moreover, in
establishing and enforcing statutory standards great care should be taken not to
undermine union self-government or weaken unions in their role as collective
bargaining agents.
Id.
The Committee expressly rejected proposals mandating more extensive
government regulation. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1002, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959),
reprinted in I NLRB LEGIS. HIST., supra note 13, at 151-65. This cautious attitude was

mirrored by almost every impartial witness summoned to testify before congressional
subcommittees. Most of these witnesses detailed the disadvantages of excessive
governmental encroachment upon internal union matters. See, e.g., Hearingson S. 505
and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1959) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.L 11/2: L11/12)
(testimony of Prof. Archibald Cox); Hearings on H.R. 3540 and Related Bills Before
the Joint Subcomm. On Educ. and Labor, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1959) (Sup. Doc.
No. Y4 Ed8/1: B61/3) (testimony of then Secretary of Labor Mitchell).
19. For the text of section 401(e), 29 U.S.C. §481(e) (1970), see note 9 supra.
Legislative protection of the basic right to candidacy was justified because overly
restrictive eligibility rules tended to stifle democracy by discouraging effective
opposition to entrenched leadership and by reducing membership interest. See Beaird,
supra note 16, at 1318; see generally Note, The Election Labyrinth: An Inquiry into
Title IV of the LMRDA, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 336, 342-46 (1968).
The right to become a candidate is vital to one of the essential, but often
overlooked, functions of union elections. The Supreme Court has acknowledged an
opposition party's interest "in appearing on the ballot merely to show that it is part of
the political structure of the union." Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 146 n.7 (1964).
Opposition groups in unions may have no serious expectation of unseating the
incumbents but they may receive a substantial enough vote to voice an effective
protest, thereby building momentum for possible success in the next election.
Consequently, "[d]epriving members of the right to run for office takes away both
their chance to govern the union and the benefits that can accrue from an election
campaign." Beaird, supra note 16, at 1318 (footnotes omitted). See also Summers,
Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 YALE L.J. 1221 (1961).

20. See generally Barnard, supra note 13, at 1243-44. The general nature of the
language in the "reasonable qualifications" clause was typical of the political
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Prior to Local 3489, the federal courts were sharply divided on how to
reconcile these dual congressional objectives of preserving union democracy
and union autonomy. 21 In interpreting the ambiguous language of section
22
401(e), the courts have emphasized one of these purposes over the other.
The Supreme Court, addressing this issue in Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local
6,23 held that a prior officeholding candidacy rule rendering 93% of the union
compromises which resulted in the adoption of broad statutory standards throughout
Title IV. For example, another clause in section 401(e) provided that "a reasonable
opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates." 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970).
Similarly, §401(c) stated that unions shall "comply with all reasonable requests of
candidates" to distribute campaign literature. Id. § 481(c) (1970). Moreover, the
election process as a whole operated under the catchall clause that "adequate
safeguards to insure a fair election shall be provided." Id.
The political pressures to strike a balance between union democracy and
union self-government were largely responsible for this imprecise language. These
pressures provoked Senator Griffin to remark that the final product was a "scissors
and paste" affair. See Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, 46 VA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1960).
The potential problems of interpretation created by the failure of Congress to
define "reasonable qualifications" were anticipated by at least one senator. Referring
to § 401(e), Senator Barry Goldwater severely criticized the ambiguity of the language:
In this section, as throughout the Senate bill, there is a veritable deluge of such
words as "reasonable," "fair," "interested," etc. used to qualify the rights and
remedies the bill professes to confer. These adjectives are undefined and their use
throws an impossible burden of definition on the administrative officials and the
courts which must apply them. Nothing in the legislative history of the bill...
sheds any light on what these terms mean, their scope, or their limitations. The
inevitable result will be that the courts will necessarily tend to give them the
most restricted possible application, that is, one which will deviate least from
current practices.
105 CONG. REC. 10101 (1959); See Barnard, supra note 13, at 1242.
The Secretary of Labor is charged with the enforcement of § 401(e). 29 U.S.C.
§482(b) (1970). Therefore, it is his responsibility to formulate administrative
guidelines defining "reasonable" union candidacy qualifications. In general, the
Secretary has taken a subjective case-by-case, rule-by-rule approach. For an extensive
documentation of the evolution of the Secretary's administrative positions and
litigation record, see Barnard, supra note 13, at 1243-70. See also Note, Power of the
Secretary of Labor to Litigate Election Violations Not Included in the Member's IntraUnion Complaint, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1323 (1973).
21. See, e.g., Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964); Wirtz v. National Maritime
Union of America, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968); Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir.
1964); Brennan v. Local 3911, United Steelworkers of America, 372 F. Supp. 961 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); Wirtz v. Local 262, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 290 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal.
1968). See note 22 and accompanying text infra.
22. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Local 18, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 440 F.2d 485
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971) (emphasizing the necessity of modeling
union elections on democratic political processes); Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6,
381 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 492 (1968) (emphasizing the legislative
policy of leaving to the unions the maximum degree of self-government).
A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in Hodgson v. Local
6799, United Steelworkers of America, 403 U.S. 333 (1971), demonstrates this
difference of emphasis well. The opinions are noteworthy for the manner in which
they use the legislative history of the LMRDA to support either a narrow or a broad
construction of §402(e). Justice Marshall found a "clear congressional concern for the
need to remedy abuses in union elections without departing needlessly from the longstanding congressional policy against unnecessary governmental interference with
internal union affairs." Id. at 338 (citation omitted). In his dissent, Justice Brennan
emphasized only the special function of Title IV to insure "free and democratic
elections." Id. at 342 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
23. 391 U.S. 492 (1968).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss1/10

6

Ossola: Labor Law - Labor-Management Reporting and Dislcosure Act - Meeti
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23

members ineligible for office was unreasonable because it conflicted with the
congressional policy to insure "free and democratic" elections.2 4 Citing two
cases decided earlier in the 1968 Term, Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle
Blowers Association,2 5 and Wirtz v. Local 125, Laborers' International
Union,26 the Court determined that "Congress plainly did not intend that
qualifications uniformly
the authorization in [section] 401(e) of 'reasonable
27
imposed' should be given a broad reach.

Most courts confronted with meeting attendance rules, as distinct from
the prior officeholding rule involved in Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6,
have recognized that Congress intended to eliminate the use of strict
requirements by incumbents seeking to protect their position. 28 Other courts,
24. 391 U.S. at 499, 505. Accord, Brennan v. Local 3911, United Steelworkers of
America, 372 F. Supp. 961, 967 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (three-year, 50% attendance rule
excluding 94.7% of membership held unreasonable); Wirtz v. Local 262, Glass Bottle
Blowers Ass'n, 290 F. Supp. 965, 968 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (one-year, 75% rule rendering
98.4% of membership ineligible held unreasonable); Wirtz v. Independent Workers
Union of Florida, 65 L.R.R.M. 2104, 2110 (M.D. Fla. 1967) (requirement of attendance
at one meeting during each quarter for three years before nomination held
unreasonable as it disqualified 99% of membership); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle
Blowers Ass'n, 244 F. Supp. 745, 750 (W.D. Pa. 1965), vacated as moot, 372 F.2d 86 (3d
Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 463 (1968) (75%, two year rule held unreasonable as it
disqualified 97% of membership).
The Court, in reaching its conclusion in Hotel Employees Local 6, noted that
"[t]he check of democratic elections as a preventive measure is seriously impaired by
candidacy qualifications which substantially deplete the ranks of those who might
run in opposition to incumbents." 391 U.S. at 505. The Court pointed out that "the
freedom allowed unions to run their own elections was reserved for those elections
which conform to the democratic principles written into [§] 401." Id. at 496-97,
quoting Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 471 (1968). The
Court rejected the local's defense of its prior officeholding rule based on the claim that
experienced candidates were necessary due to the complexity of the local's affairs. 391
U.S. at 504. This argument "assumes that rank-and-file union members are unable to
distinguish qualified from unqualified candidates for particular offices without a
demonstration of a candidate's performance in other offices." Id. The Court concluded
that "Congress' model of democratic elections was political elections in this country,
and they are not based on any such assumption." Id.
25. 389 U.S. 463 (1968). In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary's
right to a court order voiding a challenged election was not mooted because the union
conducted another unsupervised election after the complaint was filed. Id. at 474-75.
The Court never considered the reasonableness of the meeting attendance rule
involved in the case, although the opinion once referred to the meeting-attendance
rule as "unlawful." Id. at 466-67.
26. 389 U.S. 477 (1968). This was the companion case to Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass
Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463 (1968). See note 25 supra.
27. 391 U.S. at 499. The Court maintained that this conclusion was "buttressed by
other provisions of the [LMRDA] which stress freedom of members to nominate
candidates for office." Id. (footnotes omitted).
28. See, e.g. Brennan v. Local 3911, United Steelworkers of America, 372 F. Supp.
961 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union of Fla., 55 LAB. CAS. (CCH)
11857 (M.D. Fla. 1967). See also Beaird, supra note 16, at 1320.
By providing attendance requirements for most responsible offices, unions
seek to eliminate immediately the competent but unprepared candidate. The unions
fear that "an officer unfamiliar with the conditions of the industry could precipitate a
long and costly strike by making unreasonable demands of the employer," thereby
disrupting industrial peace. Note, supra note 19, at 343. Similarly, if a newly elected
officer was unfamiliar with the intricacies of collective bargaining and the union's
past practices, the gains secured over a number of years could be lost in one
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however, have stressed the union interest in an attendance rule designed to
29
insure knowledgeable and responsible leadership. In particular, there has
been a split between circuit courts over the reasonableness of 50%
disastrous bargaining session. Id. Attendance rules are intended to prevent such a
result by insuring at the outset that candidates at least have kept current with union
business. Id.
Nevertheless, meeting attendance rules tend to entrench incumbents because
of the well-documented fact that union members simply do not regularly attend
meetings. Barnard, supra note 13, at 1251; Kleiler, The Impact of Titles I-IV of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, 3 GA. L. REV. 378, 391 (1969). Whereas most officers are
obligated to attend meetings under the terms of the union constitution, incidentally
satisfying the candidacy requirement, the membership as a whole generally displays
little interest. Id. The AFL-CIO has itself recognized this phenomenon. See AFL-CIO
MANUAL FOR SHOP STEWARDS, Pub. No. 75, March 1971, at 11. Other types of
candidacy restrictions have been viewed as even more favorable to incumbents. For
example, requirements of prenomination declarations of candidacy have been
invalidated because they permit incumbents to harass prospective candidates long
before the election. See Wirtz v. Local 545, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 64
L.R.R.M. 2449 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), partially rev'd on other grounds, 381 F.2d 448 (2d Cir.
1967); Wirtz v. Local 406, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 254 F. Supp. 962 (E.D. La.
1966); Wirtz v. Local 30, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 242 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), vacated as moot, 366 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1966). Similarly, dues prepayment.
requirements are "plainly suited to cultivate entrenched management." Goldberg v.
Amarillo Gen. Drivers Union, 214 F. Supp. 74, 78 (N.D. Tex. 1963).
29. See, e.g., Shultz v. Local 1299, United Steelworkers of America, 324 F. Supp.
750 (E.D. Mich. 1970), affd in part sub nom. Hodgson v. Local 129% United
Steelworkers of America, 453 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1971). In Local 1299, the court
considered an attendance requirement a legitimate means of familiarizing prospective
candidates with "that which is entailed in the management of the local's affairs." Id.
at 756. See also Shultz v. Local 1150, United Steelworkers of America, 75 L.R.R.M.
2869 (S.D. Ind. 1970); Martin v. Boilermakers Local 636, 245 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa.
1963) (stressing the union interest. in dislodging entrenched incumbents and
educating rank and file members concerning management problems). Another court
observed that a requirement of attendance at six of the 24 meetings before the election
was "in accord with the public desire and legislative intent that methods are
acceptable by unions that tend to stimulate better attendance at union meetings."
Schultz v. Aluminum Workers Local 420, 74 L.R.R.M. 2281, 2282 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
Similar sentiments were expressed most forcefully in a Second Circuit
decision which was reversed by the Supreme Court. Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6,
381 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 492 (1968). The circuit court stressed "the
general congressional policy to allow unions great latitude in resolving their own
internal controversies." 381 F.2d at 504, quoting Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140
(1964). The court discerned a rational relation between the prior office requirement
and officer competence. The court observed that "it is not self-evident that basic
minimum principles of union democracy require that every union entrust the
administration of its affairs to untrained and inexperienced rank and file members."
381 F.2d at 505. Consequently it did not seem unreasonable that the union "should
hesitate to permit a cook or waiter or a dishwasher without any training or experience
in the management of union affairs to take on responsibility for the complex and
difficult problem of administration of this union." Id. Prospective candidates could
meet with officers at union meetings and thereby acquaint themselves with the
complex details of contract negotiations, enforcement of contract clauses and union
finances. Id. Finally, the court concluded that "it is not the function of the Secretary
to determine what prescribed qualifications for office will best serve the purposes of
union democracy nor to dictate what policy unions should follow in limiting
candidacy for union office." Id. at 506.
Another court recognized that a defendant union had argued "with some
force" that a three-year 50% attendance requirement fulfilled legitimate union
purposes by "encourag[ing] broad based participation in the affairs of the union,
assur[ing] that the candidates who are elected have demonstrated at least minimal
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0
For example, in Brennan v. Local 5724, United
attendance requirements.A
31
Steelworkers of America, the Sixth Circuit upheld the Steelworkers' threeyear, 50% attendance requirement although more than 80% of the local
members were barred from eligibility for office.,2 The court determined that
the disqualifying impact of the rule did not thwart the legislative goals of
the LMRDA because "the rule [did] not by itself disqualify anyone and...
[did] serve legitimate union objectives." 33 In contrast, the First Circuit, in
Usery v. Local Div. 1205, Amalgamated Transit Union, struck down a rule

interest and concern with local union affairs, and tend[ing] to produce officers who
through their participation in local union affairs have some familiarity with the
responsibilities and duties attendant upon holding union office, including responsibility and duties imposed on them by the Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 itself." Brennan v. Local 3911, United Steelworkers of America, 372 F. Supp. 961,
965-66 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
30. See 429 U.S. at 307 n.3. Most courts considering the merits of the
Steelworkers' attendance rule involved in the instant case have determined it to be
reasonable. See, e.g., Brennan v. Local 5724, United Steelworkers of America, 489 F.2d
884 (6th Cir. 1973); Shultz v. Local 1299, United Steelworkers of America, 324 F. Supp.
750 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd in part sub nom. Hodgson v. Local 1299, United
Steelworkers of America, 453 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1971); Shultz v. Local 1150, United
Steelworkers of America, 75 L.R.R.M. 2869 (S.D. Ind. 1970), vacated on other grounds,
No. 71-1467 (7th Cir. July 7, 1971) (unreported); Schultz v. Local Union 6799, United
Steelworkers of America, 71 L.R.R.M. 2820 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd on other grounds,
426 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Hodgson v. Local 6799, United
Steelworkers of America, 403 U.S. 333 (1971).
However, similar meeting attendance requirements of other unions have been
struck down as unreasonable. See, e.g., Usery v. Local Div. 1205, Amalgamated
Transit Union, 545 F.2d 1300 (1st Cir. 1976); Brennan v. Local Union No. 639, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 494 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle
Blowers Ass'n, 405 F.2d 176 (3rd Cir. 1968).
31. 489 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1973).
32. Id. at 891. The court noted that little effort was required to satisfy the
eligibility requirement: a member had to spend only 36 hours at union meetings every
three years. Id. at 888. Moreover, the meetings followed a set pattern and were held at
a convenient location and time for purposes of accommodating a majority of the
members. Id. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that "the real cause of the large scale
disqualifications is not the per se existence of the Steelworkers' rule but the failure of
union members to attend the meetings." Id. See Shultz v. Local Union 6799, United
Steelworkers of America, 71 L.R.R.M. 2820 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd on other grounds,
426 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Hodgson v. Local 6799, United
Steelworkers of America, 403 U.S. 333 (1971). The district court pointed out that any
member who wanted to comply with an attendance requirement could easily do so.
33. 489 F.2d at 889. The court noted that "[u]nlike the Hotel Employees bylaw
[which required that candidates have held prior office], the Steelworkers rule
disqualifies no one." Id. Thus, every member could qualify for union office "by the
relatively unburdensome step of devoting a few hours per month to the affairs of his
Union." Id. The Sixth Circuit refused to accept the Secretary's contention that the
Supreme Court's decision in Hotel Employees commanded "blind adherence" to a per
se method of analysis making the number of members disqualified the touchstone for
determining reasonableness. Id. The Local 5724 court distinguished Hodgson v. Local
Union 18, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 40 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1971), which
construed the reasonableness of a rule requiring prospective candidates to transfer to
the parent local from sub-locals in order to qualify for union office, on the grounds
that there was no relationship between the rule involved in that case and a member's
fitness for office. 489 F.2d at 888. In contrast, the Steelworkers' attendance rule had "a
direct, substantial relationship to fitness to hold office in that participation in union
meetings is one indicia of interest in union affairs." Id. at 889. See note 29 supra.
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requiring prospective candidates to attend 50% of the union meetings each
year during the two years preceding the election. 34 Despite its acknowledgment that the union interest in limiting eligibility to informed candidates
was legitimate, the court concluded that this interest could be protected by
35
less restrictive qualifications.
Against this background of dual congressional purposes and conflicting
court decisions, 36 the Local 3489 Court examined the reasonableness of the
Local's attendance requirement in terms of its consistency with the basic
objective of Title IV of the LMRDA to guarantee "free and democratic"
elections. 37 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, 38 began his analysis
by observing that the legislative history of the LMRDA and the structure of
section 401(e) severely limited the power of unions to impose qualifications
on candidates for union office. 39 Consequently, the Court observed, those
qualifications which "substantially deplete" the ranks of those who might
run in opposition to incumbents "seriously impaired" the check of
democratic elections as a preventive measure against the abuses of
40
entrenched leadership.
34. Usery v. Local Div. 1205, Amalgamated Transit Union, 545 F.2d 1300 (1st Cir.
1976). The rule included a liberal excuse provision whereby a member who missed a
meeting for a legitimate reason could receive attendance credit by sending a postcard
to the recording secretary within 10 days of the meeting. Id. at 1302. The First Circuit
pointed out that this provision tended to undermine the justification for the rule by
allowing prospective candidates to avoid coming to meetings and yet still qualify for
office. Id. at 1304 n.3.
35. Id. at 1304. Implicit in the court's reasoning was the idea that the earlier a
prospective candidate had to decide on his candidacy, the less likely it was that an
opposition movement would be able to generate enthusiasm among the membership
because the election was simply too far away. See notes 42 & 43 and accompanying
text infra. It should be noted, however, that the court avoided addressing the issue of
how much shorter the qualification period should be in order to be considered
reasonable.
In Brennan v. Local 3911, United Steelworkers of America, 372 F. Supp. 961
(N.D. Ill. 1973), a district court invalidated the same attendance requirement involved
in Local 3489 because it was inconsistent with the congressional assumption that
"voters can be trusted to exercise common sense and judgment on the qualifications of
candidates." Id. at 966, citing Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 504
(1968). It should be noted that the court recognized a strong argument for the
reasonableness of the challenged attendance requirement in the regulations issued by
the Department of Labor. 372 F. Supp. at 966. The court referred to the regulations
then in effect which provided that it was reasonable under ordinary circumstances for
a union to require attendance at 50% of the 12 or 24 meetings preceding the election.
Id., citing DEPT. OF LABOR, LMRDA INTERPRETIVE MANUAL,
422, 205, 422, 206. See
notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text infra.
36. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
37. 429 U.S. at 309. The Court pointed out that Congress had chosen this goal in
order "to curb the possibility of abuse by benevolent as well as malevolent entrenched
leadership." Id., quoting Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 391 U.S. at 503.
38. The opinion of the Court was joined in by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
39. 429 U.S. at 308-09.
40. Id. at 309-10, citing Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968). It
should be noted that the Court considered democratic elections to be a "preventive
measure." 429 U.S. at 309. Thus, the Court could overlook the fact that the Local had
no history of entrenched leadership; rather, the Court was concerned with
maintaining the necessary procedures to avoid this entrenchment by incumbents. Id.
at 311-12.
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Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court found the
impact of the Local's attendance rule to be indistinguishable from that of
the prior officeholding rule held invalid in Hotel Employees. 41 Furthermore,
the attendance requirement necessitated a premature candidacy decision at
least eighteen months prior to the election. 42 Finding that opposition to
incumbent leadership often emerges only shortly before elections, 43 the
majority reasoned that this stringent time limit could only discourage
dissident candidacies, thereby impairing the members' freedom to displace
incumbents.14 Rejecting the contention that the Local's frequent officer
turnover was indicative of an open electoral process, 45 the Court stated that
qualification procedures which "unduly restrict free choice among candi46
dates are forbidden" without regard to election results.
Moreover, the majority concluded that the meeting attendance rule
failed to serve the union interests advanced in its support. 47 For example,
the majority found no evidence that the rule encouraged meeting attendance. 48 With respect to the rule's potential for assuring more qualified
officers, the Local 3489 majority maintained that Title IV reflected the
congressional determination that "the best means to this end is to leave the
choice of leaders to the membership in open democratic elections, unfettered
by arbitrary exclusions." 49 Finally, Justice Brennan considered the Local's
contention that it was unable to anticipate the validity of its meeting
attendance rule because neither the Secretary nor the courts had formulated
a precise standard whereby unions could accurately gauge the reasonableness of their attendance requirements. 50 The majority concluded that a

41. Id. at 310. The impact of each rule was to exclude over 90% of the membership
from eligibility for office. Id. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
42. 429 U.S. at 311. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
43. 429 U.S. at 310-11. The Court accepted the Secretary's suggestion that the
absence of an "opposition party" in the Local was typical of most unions. Id. at 311
n.7. A challenge to the incumbent leadership could thus be expected "in response to
particular issues at different times" - not necessarily as early as 18 months before
the election. Id. at 311.
Only the International Typographical Union has a long-established, functioning two-party system in which the opposition party maintains its organization while
out of office. See generally LIPSET, TROUT & COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY (1956).
44. 429 U.S. at 311.
45. Id. at 311-12. See note 60 and accompanying text infra.
46. 429 U.S. at 312. The Court rejected the Local's attempt to justify the rule on
the grounds that it imposed no hardship on a member seeking to qualify as a
candidate. Id. at 310-11 n.6. Pointing out that "this argument misconceives the evil at
which the statute aims," the majority maintained that the only relevant burden was
the rule's effect "on free and democratic processes of union government." Id., citing
Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
47. 429 U.S. at 312. See note 59 infra.
48. 429 U.S. at 312. The record revealed the failure of the rule to stimulate interest
in union meetings. Id. n.8. It also demonstrated that attendance requirements were
ineffective in encouraging potential opposition candidates to attend meetings even for
the sole purpose of qualifying to run for office. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 313. See text accompanying notes 89 & 90 infra.
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flexible standard was precisely what Congress had intended and that this
standard was adequate to enable the Local to draft a valid attendance rule. 1
In his dissenting opinion,5 2 Justice Powell labelled the majority's
holding "an unwarranted interference with the right of the union to manage
its own internal affairs." 3 Contrasting the dual congressional objectives
apparent from the statute's legislative history with the majority's narrow
reasoning, 54 the dissent characterized the controlling weight given to the
rule's exclusionary impact "as com[ing] close to .

.

. a per se 'effects'

analysis." 5 Justice Powell argued that the application of this method of
analysis to the Local's attendance rule "extended the reach of Hotel
' 6
Employees far beyond the holding and basic rationale of that case."
Specifically, the dissent maintained that such an indiscriminate extension
disregarded the striking dissimilarities between the candidacy rules
involved in each case.5 7 In Hotel Employees, the rule's effect was
"predetermined for the purpose of perpetuating control of a few insiders,
whereas here the effect resulted from the free choice - perhaps the
51. 429 U.S. at 313-14. In support of this position, the majority referred to the
Secretary's recent formulation of a "totality of circumstances" test for determining
reasonableness:
It may be reasonable for a labor organization to establish a requirement of
attendance at a specified number of its regular meetings during the period
immediately preceding an election, in order to insure that candidates have a
demonstrated interest in and familiarity with the affairs of the organization. In
the past, it was ordinarily considered reasonable to require attendance at no
more than 50 percent of the meetings over a period not exceeding two years.
Experience has demonstrated that it is not feasible to establish arbitrary
guidelines for judging the reasonableness of such a qualification. Its reasonableness must be gauged in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case,
including not only the frequency of meetings, the number of meetings which
must be attended and the period of time over which the requirement extends, but
also such factors as the nature, availability and extent of excuse provisions,
whether all or most members have the opportunity to attend meetings, and the
impact of the rule, i.e., the number of percentage of members who would be
rendered ineligible by its application.
29 C.F.R. § 452.38(a) (1976).
Significantly, this regulation had not yet been promulgated at the time of the
1970 election in the instant case. The regulation then in effect indicated that an
attendance rule requiring 50% attendance over a two-year period was not unreasonable if uniformly applied. Id. § 452.38 (1967).
52. 429 U.S. at 314-17 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell was joined in his
dissenting opinion by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist.
53. Id. at 314 (Powell, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 314-15 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell emphasized that the
legislative history of the LMRDA "shows that Congress weighed how best to legislate
against revealed abuses in union elections without departing needlessly from its longstanding policy against unnecessary governmental intrusion into internal union
affairs." Id. at 314, quoting Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S.
463, 470-71 (1968). In his view, §401(e) "reflects a congressional intent to
accommodate both of these purposes." 429 U.S. at 315, (Powell, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
55. 429 U.S. at 315 (Powell, J., dissenting). A per se "effects" rule would require
invalidation of a union election whenever a candidacy rule disqualified most members
from eligibility for office, irrespective of the union interests advanced in support of the
rule. Id.
56. Id. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
57. 429 U.S. at 315-16 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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indifference - of the rank and file membership." 8 Examining the record,
the dissent concluded that the rule served legitimate union purposes 59 "at
least facially" and that the available evidence demonstrated the openness of
the Local's political process. 6
The difficulty of assessing the propriety of the Local 3489 Court's
conclusion stems from the absence of a legislative standard of reasonableness under section 401(e). 61 Since the Court has attempted to resolve the
conflict between the circuit courts over the interpretation of section 401(e)'s
qualification clause in light of its legislative history, 62 the decision in Local
3489 should be evaluated both in terms of its conformance with the rules of
statutory construction and its overall consistency with the legislative intent.
Accordingly, it should be noted that the majority's reasoning rested on a
solid legal foundation established in previous constructions of remedial
statutes. 63 Under well-recognized tenets of statutory construction, exceptions
to remedial statutes are narrowly construed.6 4 Conforming to this principle,
58. Id. at 316 (Powell, J., dissenting). The effect of the Hotel Employees rule was

predetermined because very few members had ever held elective office; thus, extensive
disqualification was an inevitable by-product of a prior officeholding requirement. Id.
59. Id. The dissent noted that the legitimate union purposes served by the rule
included the following: "(i) encouraging attendance at meetings; (ii) requiring
candidates for office to demonstrate a meaningful interest in the union and its affairs;
and (iii) assuring that members who seek office have had an opportunity to become
informed as to union affairs." Id. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
60. 429 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., dissenting). The record showed a high rate of
officer turnover in past elections. Id. For example, five different presidents had been
elected during the 10 years preceding the 1970 election, and in the course of four
separate elections an estimated 40 changes in officers occurred. Id. Neither the Seventh
Circuit nor the Supreme Court opinion reveals whether these elections were contested.
61. See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
62. 429 U.S. at 309-10. See notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra. See also
notes 30-35 & 37 and accompanying text supra.
63. See, e.g, FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1948) (holding that the
burden of proving exemption under a special exception to Robinson-Patman Act rests
on one who claims its benefits); Walling v. General Indus. Co., 330 U.S. 545, 547-48
(1947) (exceptions to Fair Labor Standards Act applied only if requisite conditions
satisfied); Piedmont & No. Ry. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1932) (holding that
exemptions to Transportation Act, being remedial legislation, should be narrowly
construed); Yogurt Master, Inc. v. Goldberg, 310 F.2d 53, 55 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963) (holding that the exemption provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act should be narrowly construed).
In light of the congressional finding that disfranchisement constituted the
major violation of democratic principles in union elections, § 401(e) of the LMRDA
was intended to correct this deficiency and may therefore be labelled "remedial." See
Senate Select Comm. on Improper Activities in the Labor-Management Field, S. REP.
No. 621, 86th Cong. 1st Sess., SECOND INTERIM REPORT, 51-54 (1959).
64. See note 63 supra.An excellent example of the Court's narrow construction of
exceptions to remedial statutes can be found in A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324
U.S. 490 (1945). The Walling Court, in interpreting an exemption to the Fair Labor
Standards Act announced that:
Any exemption from such humanitarian and remedial legislation must therefore
be narrowly construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of statutory
language and the intent of Congress. To extend an exemption to other than those
plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretive
process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.
Id. at 493, quoted in Barnard, supra note 13, at 1277-78. Several commentators have
advocated strict adherence to this rule of statutory construction. See, e.g., Barnard,
supra note 13, at 1319-20; Beaird, supra note 16, at 1277-78.
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the Local 3489 Court recognized that the "reasonable qualifications" clause
of section 401(e) constituted the permissible exception to the general rule of
universal eligibility for office.6 5 The Court properly assumed that the burden
66
of proof weighed heavily on a party invoking the terms of the exception. In
accord with this canon of construction, the Local was obligated to
demonstrate that its departure6 7from universal candidacy clearly fell within
the reasonableness exception.
While the Court's statutory construction of section 401(e) was sound,
canons of construction should not be employed to defeat the legislative
objectives of the statute as a whole. 68 It is submitted that the Local 3489
Court did, however, construe the "reasonable qualifications" clause so
narrowly that the legislative balance between union democracy and union
autonomy was subverted. By invoking an overbroad interpretation of the
69
public interest in democratic union election, the Court minimized the
countervailing congressional intent to temper governmental intrusion into
internal union affairs. 7 Specifically, the Local 3489 Court has limited the
range of "reasonable qualifications" so as to impose an overbearing burden
of proof on the Local. 71 Moreover, the Court has avoided the crucial question
65. See 429 U.S. at 308-12; see generally Beaird, supra note 16, at 1319. With

respect to section 401(e), one commentator has suggested that "a court is probably on

sound legal (as well as practical) grounds in appraising most [candidacy] restrictions
with a skeptical eye, demanding a demonstrably good reason before allowing any
limitation to qualify as 'reasonable' and thereby erode the 'prima facie' right of 'every
member to run for office.'" St. Antoine, Landrum.Griffin, 1965-1966: A Calculus of
Democratic Values, 19 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 35, 49 (1966) (footnote omitted).
See also Beaird, supra note 16, at 1324.
66. See 429 U.S. at 309-11.
67. Id. See generally Beaird, supra note 16, at 1319-20. The district court decision
in Hotel Employees recited the general rule that the burden of showing that a
qualification imposed by a union on eligibility to hold office is reasonable is "a very
heavy one." Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 265 F. Supp. 510, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 381 F.2d 500, rev'd, 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
In his dissent, Justice Powell disagreed with this approach by maintaining
that the Secretary "bears the burden of proving that the [Steelworkers'] rule is
,unreasonable.'" 429 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., dissenting).
68. See, e.g., New York State Dep't of Social Services/v. Dublino, 409 U.S. 940
(1972); United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1949); Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda
Bank, 293 U.S. 84 (1934); Constanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 (1932); Danciger v.
Cooley, 248 U.S. 319 (1918).
69. The Court emphasized that "Congress emphatically asserted a vital public
interest in assuring free and democratic union elections that transcends the narrower
interest of the complaining union member." 429 U.S. at 309, quoting Wirtz v. Local
153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 475 (1968). Accord, Wirtz v. Local 125,
Laborers' Int'l Union, 389 U.S. 477, 483 (1968) (provisions of section 401 are necessary
protections of the public interest as well as of the rights and interests of union
members). This public interest has been defined in terms of the maintenance of a rule

of internal democracy in a manner consistent with the preservation of the union's
collective bargaining capability. Comment, supra note 13, at 1116.
70. See S. REP. No. 187, supra note 13, at 7, reprinted in I NLRB LEGIS. HIST.,
supra note 13, at 401; see also note 18 and accompanying text supra.
71. See 429 U.S. at 312-13. Under the Court's analysis, it would appear to be
nearly impossible for any union to meet the burden of proving that an eligibility
requirement is necessary to guarantee quality officers. The relationship between
eligibility rules and officer competency has not been sufficiently documented to
overcome a presumption that restrictive rules are per se antidemocratic, particularly
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of whether a meeting attendance rule ever bears any rational relationship to
72
candidate competency.
Unlike the Local 3489 Court, Congress sought to develop broad
principles of fairness within which unions could prescribe specific candidacy
7 3
requirements designed to reflect their particular needs and circumstances.
In contrast to this flexibility, it is submitted that the Local 3489 Court
established the absolute principle that the fewer union members to qualify
as candidates, the less democratic the election.7 4 Although the Court did not
expressly adopt a per se method of analysis, the majority's reasoning
constituted the substantial equivalent of a per se rationale.7 5 It is submitted
that an impartial assessment of the legislative history of the LMRDA does
not substantiate the per se invalidation of any candidacy requirement that

where most eligibility rules must be restrictive in order to be effective. Justice
Brennan stated that "[plursuing [the] goal [of more qualified officers] by excluding the
bulk of the membership from eligibility for office, and thus limiting the possibility of
dissident candidacies, runs directly counter to the basic premise of the statute." Id. at
312.
Justice Brennan's statement seems to imply that the Local's attendance
requirement was intended to disqualify a large proportion of members from eligibility.
It should be noted that no evidence of such discriminatory intent was cited by the
Court in its review of the record. Id. at 310-12.
72. See notes 28 & 29 and accompanying text supra. See also Wirtz v. Nat'l
Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968) (court
found requiring a prospective candidate for a maritime union office to have a certain
shipping status was related to the best interest of the union). In determining the
"necessity" of a meeting attendance requirement to insure officer competence, the
practices of other unions would seem relevant. See Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6,
391 U.S. 492, 505 (1968). It is logical to conclude that a restriction is unnecessary if the
majority of other unions can get along without it, and the converse would also hold
true. See generally Berchem, supra note 15, at 38. See also Wirtz v. Local 406, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 254 F. Supp. 962 (E.D. La. 1966), where the court noted
that this union was the only one of 73 national unions requiring the particular
eligibility rules in question. Id. at 965. However, the usefulness of such comparisons
may be limited in light of the dissimilar problems and needs of different unions. One
commentator has argued that a meaningful determination of the union interest in
imposing an eligibility rule can be made only by studying the economic, political, and
social structure of the union and of the industry in which it functions. Note, supra
note 19, at 345.
73. See note 81 and accompanying text infra.
74. See 429 U.S. at 312-13.
75. See 429 U.S. at 315 '(Powell, J., dissenting). See also text accompanying note
55 supra. The Court presumed that any attendance rule having a restrictive impact
like that of the Local's "hardly seems to be a 'reasonable qualification' consistent
with the goal of free and democratic elections." 429 U.S. at 310. See also notes 13-20
supra. In other words, such a restrictive requirement was per se unreasonable. See
note 55 supra.
Adherence to this rigid approach is not mandated by Hotel Employees, which
involved a rule restricting eligibility for office to prior officeholders and which, as that
Court found, did perpetuate control by incumbents. 391 U.S. at 502-03. In contrast, as
emphasized in the dissent in Local 3489, there was "no history of entrenched
leadership" in the Local; rather, "the record is to the contrary." 429 U.S. at 317
(Powell, J., dissenting). On these grounds Hotel Employees would appear to be clearly
distinguishable. Rather than focusing upon the different purpose and effect of the
rules involved in the two cases, however, the Local 3489 Court chose to avoid
considering the causes of entrenched leadership. Instead, the Court reasoned that
since "the reasons why leaderships became entrenched are difficult to isolate,"
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fails to satisfy the Court's indeterminate standard of participatory
democracy. In fact, the Court's adoption of a "statistical effects test" is
antithetical to the LMRDA's balancing approach.7 6 Furthermore, by
employing this ambiguous standard, 7 the Court neglected to examine the
factors underlying the rule's effect. 7 s If apathy rather than the stringency of

the requirement was the real cause of the rule's restrictive effect, the
percentage of the membership eligible for office should not be dispositive of
79
the reasonableness issue.
Congress determined that union members themselves, rather than the courts, were
best equipped "to correct abuse of power by entrenched leadership" through
democratic elections. Id. at 311-12.
Although Congress never actually equated the number of members qualifying
for union office with a democratic electoral process, other courts have agreed with the
Local 3489 Court on the per se approach, arguing that the real purpose of candidacy
requirements is to limit potential opposition to the incumbent administration and that
rule which excludes a large number of members from candidacy is of necessity
undemocratic. See, e.g., Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47, 63
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968); Wirtz v. Local 30, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 242 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), vacated as moot, 366 F.2d 438 (2d
Cir. 1966).
Nevertheless, even the Secretary has avoided the issue of how many members
must qualify as candidates to make the election "democratic." In an early set of
guidelines, the Secretary took the position that "should the actual effect of such
qualification in a particular case be to disqualify from holding office all but a handful
of the labor organization's members, its reasonableness would be subject to serious
question." 29 C.F.R. § 452.7(b) (1965) (emphasis added).
76. See notes 13-19 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted that the
Local 3489 Court purported to adopt a balancing rationale when Justice Brennan
stated that "the antidemocratic effects of the meeting attendance rule outweigh the
interests urged in its support." 429 U.S. at 310. However, whether the Court actually
employed this method of analysis is open to serious question in light of the controlling
weight given to the rule's disqualifying impact. See text accompanying notes 44-46
supra.
77. See note 89 and accompanying text infra.
78. See 429 U.S. at 316 (Powell, J., dissenting). The cause of the failure of most
members to qualify as candidates may be a function of their free choice. For example,
one study determined that less than 10% of union members attend union meetings,
notwithstanding the presence of meeting attendance rules for candidacy. J. SEIDMAN,
DEMOCRACY IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT, 20 (1958). See note 28 supra. One
commentator has observed that courts cannot decree union democracy, "for apathetic
members cannot be compelled to action, nor can indifference be transformed to
interest." Summers, The Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy, 48 AM.
ECON. REV. 421, 52 (Supp. 1958). It therefore would seem incumbent upon the Local
3489 Court to at least remand the case to the lower court for a finding of fact
concerning the actual causes of the rule's restrictive effect. In Brennan v. Local 5724,
United Steelworkers of America, 489 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1973), the court made such a
finding by determining that "the real cause of the large scale disqualifications [of
union members from eligibility for office] is not the per se existence of the
Steelworkers' rule, but the failure of union members to attend the meetings." Id. at
888. Thus the members disqualified themselves "as a matter of free choice by their
unwillingness to devote a few hours per month to union affairs." Id. at 889. If, as
seems likely, only a few members of the Local were interested in becoming candidates,
it is submitted that the Court's preoccupation with numbers was misplaced.
79. See 429 U.S. at 316 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also notes 32 & 33 and
accompanying text supra. The fact that few members are sufficiently interested to
attend 50% of union meetings does not necessarily reflect on the reasonableness of the
attendance requirement. See note 78 supra. If controlling weight is given to the
number of members choosing to comply with the attendance requirements, unions are
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It is submitted that the Court could have reached the same conclusion
and avoided a "statistical effects test" by determining whether the union
objectives advanced in support of the rule could have been reconciled with
the public interest in an open elective process. Under this approach, the
Court might have determined whether a less stringent meeting attendance
requirement could have adequately served the "legitimate and meritorious
union purposes" recognized by the dissent."0 This method of analysis would
have afforded protection to both public and union interests by balancing the
degree to which the rule limited the number of candidates against the
interest of the Local in enforcing the rule in light of its particular needs and
81
circumstances.
In addition to the Local 3489 Court's seemingly over narrow interpretation of the LMRDA,2 a close examination of the Court's reasoning also
reveals an internal inconsistency. If in the course of exercising their freedom
of choice a majority of a union's membership sanctioned strict eligibility
requirements,83 it would seem consistent with democratic principles to
placed in the untenable position of having the validity of their rules turn upon
whether the membership is willing to comply. See Martin v. Lodge 636, Int'l Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 245 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1963). In Martin, a district court observed
that to invalidate an attendance rule imposing a slight burden of compliance on
members "would hold in effect that there can be no attendance requirement whatever
in this union," notwithstanding the fact that only 14 members out of a total
membership of 175 qualified for office. Id. at 376, 378.
80. 429 U.S. at 316 (Powell, J., dissenting). See note 59 supra. For example, the
Court might have determined whether a 25% attendance requirement over a one-year
period prior to the election could have served the Local's purposes equally as well
while excluding a lesser percentage of the membership from eligibility for offige. This
approach would avoid exposing union internal affairs to any more governmental
interference than was necessary to protect the strong public interest in union
democracy. See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra. Moreover, such an approach
would allow the Court to make a serious assessment of the relationship between
meeting attendanceand officer competency. In light of the growing sophistication of
union-management relations, this assessment is essential to any meaningful
consideration of the reasonableness of a candidacy rule. See note 29 supra.
81. The "needs and circumstances" test is a highly flexible one which respects
"the general congressional policy to allow unions great latitude in resolving their own
internal controversies." Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964). See Beaird, supra
note 16, at 1321. This test was first enunciated in Goldberg v. Amarillo Gen. Drivers
Union, 214 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Tex. 1963). In Amarillo, the court concluded that the one
important question was whether the "needs or necessities of the . . . union fairly
called for" a restriction disqualifying members for late payment of dues. Id. at 80.
Similarly, in Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 244 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.
Pa. 1965), vacated as moot, 372 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 463 (1968), it was
stated that "the [c]ourt must also inquire whether the legitimate purpose sought to be
achieved could be attained in a manner less destructive of other legally protected
interests." 244 F. Supp. at 749 (citations omitted). Local 153 required a potential
candidate to have attended 75% of the union meetings since the prior election. Id.
One commentator has suggested that the "needs and circumstances" test
could be employed to permit a union to set up different candidacy requirements for
different offices. See Beaird, supra note 16, at 1321. He cautions that such a
requirement should only be sustained if some clear nexus between the eligibility rule
and the union's "cast of government" were established. Id.
82. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
83. The Local's candidacy requirements conformed to those prescribed by the
International Union's constitution which is binding on all locals. See notes 2 & 3 and
accompanying text supra. The provisions of the constitution presumably reflected the
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accord their judgment at least a presumption of legitimacy. Thus, it is
submitted that the Local 3489 Court's disregard of the members' preelection
judgment concerning the minimum standards of eligibility was inconsistent
with its concern that the union political process accurately reflect the
majority will.84 It is submitted that the Court is subverting its own
principles concerning the inviolability of the union membership's freedom of
choice by second-guessing their judgment as to the efficacy of an attendance
rule when there is no evidence that the rule has been abused to favor
incumbents.8 5 Moreover, despite the majority's more convincing emphasis
upon the disqualifying impact of the rule's requirement that a prospective
candidate decide upon his candidacy at least eighteen months in advance of
an election, it is further submitted that the alleged stringency of this
requirement does not justify imposition of the Court's per se method of
analysis, particularly where the Court has neglected to demonstrate any
clear correlation between the specific hardship imposed by the eighteen
86
month period and the disqualifying impact of the rule as a whole.
The Local 3489 decision is likely to have an unsettling impact in three
major areas: the use of candidacy qualifications by unions; the uniformity of
lower federal court adjudications of reasonableness under section 401(e); and
the sensitive balance between public and union interests embodied in the
LMRDA.
From the unions' perspective, the primary impact of Local 3489 will be
to discourage the continued use of candidacy rules that exclude most
members from eligibility for office."7 The Court's "statistical effects test"
will be viewed as prohibitive for two reasons: first, as a practical matter
majority views of all the constituent unions. The Local would have been free to
propose an amendment to the constitution providing for less stringent requirements.
However, the majority of the Local's membership did not elect to pursue that course of
action; in fact, there is no evidence in the record that anyone, other than the defeated
presidential candidate who filed the initial complaint, objected to the candidacy rule.
Id. See Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 381 F.2d 500 (1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 492
(1968), where the court observed that "[i]f the rank and file members of the union had
felt at any time during the many years in which the eligibility restriction has been in
effect that they were being unjustly barred from office, they could have sought to
amend the restrictive provision." 381 F.2d 505.
84. 429 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., dissenting). It has been suggested that because
Congress asserted a public interest in safeguarding the union electoral process, it is
unwise "to place too much reliance on the [union] members to vindicate that interest."
Wirtz v. Local 191, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 218 F. Supp. 885, 887 (D. Conn. 1963),
aff'd, 321 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963). In a similar vein, the Local 3489 Court apparently
relied on union members to make discriminating judgments in union elections, but
could not rely on those same members to make such judgments when voting for
candidate eligibility requirements.
85. See 429 U.S. at 311-12.
86. The dissent recognized that requiring attendance at 18 of the 36 meetings
prior to an election may go beyond what may be necessary to serve legitimate union
purposes. 429 U.S. at 316-17. Nevertheless, the dissent maintained that this was "'a
judgment call' best left to the unions themselves absent a stronger showing of
potential for abuse than has been made in this case." Id. at 317 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
87. This result will be the obvious consequence of the Court's narrow "effects"
analysis equating the number of candidates with the openness of the union's political
process. See notes 74-79 and accompanying text supra.
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almost all union candidacy requirements have a substantial disqualifying
effect on the membership;88 and second, the test lacks adequately defined
limits to afford unions guidance for predicting the point at which this
disqualifying effect makes a rule unreasonable. 89 Consequently, it will be
almost impossible for unions to gauge the validity of their particular
requirements without resorting to an ex post facto determination of
reasonableness by the courts ° It is submitted that this lack of a clearly
articulated judicial standard of reasonableness unfairly burdens unions in
their attempts to comply with the "reasonable qualifications" clause.91 As a
result, few unions are likely to risk the invalidation of their elections by
imposing any qualifications upon candidacy.92
By deciding Local 3489, the Supreme Court purported to resolve the
conflict in the lower federal courts over the proper interpretation of
reasonableness under section 401(e). 93 Unfortunately, however, the Local
3489 decision does not supply the lower courts with any workable, uniform
standard of reasonableness. The Local 3489 Court has failed to establish the
parameters of its decision by defining the phrase "reasonable qualifica88.

UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, UNION CONSTITUTIONS AND THE ELECTION

34 (1968). This restrictive effect is to be expected if one
assumes that the purpose of imposing the requirement is to narrow the range of
candidates to those exhibiting at least the minimum amount of responsibility and
motivation. If every member could satisfy the requirements with little or no effort, it
would be pointless to impose them.
89. See 429 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., dissenting). For example, there is not the
slightest indication in the Court's opinion as to the reasonableness of an attendance
rule requiring 60% attendance over a 12-month period and having the effect of
disqualifying 75% of the membership from eligibility. There is no way of knowing if
this rule would be distinguishable from the Local's three-year, 50% rule which
excluded 96.5% of its members. Clearly the Local 3489 rationale could apply in such a
case; the question left unresolved is whether it should or will apply. The Local 3489
decision has only confirmed that the greater the percentage of disqualified
individuals, the more likely it is that the requirement will be found unreasonable. See
generally Beaird, supra note 16, at 1322.
90. See, e.g., Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964); Hodgson v. Local 18, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 440 F.2d 485 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971);
Wirtz v. National Maritime Union of America, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968). The courts
are authorized to determine whether a violation of section 401(e), including the
qualifications clause, "may have affected the outcome of the election, and if so to
declare it void." 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1970). See note 12 supra.
91. See note 89 and accompanying text supra. This burden is unfair because it
violates a long-standing maxim of jurisprudence: "It is generally accepted that
persons should be able to determine with some degree of certainty what they may or
may not do under the law." 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 101 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
Another distinguished judge has pointed out that this principle is applicable not only
to rules of law but also to the standards imposed and the factors examined by
administrative agencies in enforcing the law. Friendly, The FederalAdministrative
Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1962).
92. The scope of this deterrence will likely encompass almost all candidacy rules
because the requirements tend to disqualify most members from eligibility for office.
See notes 78 & 79 supra.A disqualifying impact of over 90% is not unusual. U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, QUALIFICATIONS FOR UNION OFFICE 114 (1970). Moreover, the Local 3489
Court's refusal to distinguish the prior officeholding rule involved in Hotel Employees
indicates that the form of the qualification is unrelated to its reasonableness if its
effect is sufficiently "antidemocratic." 429 U.S. at 310-11.
93. See 429 U.S. at 307. See also notes 21 & 22 and accompanying text supra.
OF LOCAL UNION OFFICERS
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tions." Specifically, the Court did not indicate the maximum permissible
percentage of members that could be barred by a reasonable rule. As a
result, future courts must define the scope of "reasonable qualifications" on
a case-by-case basis, particularly when they encounter a wide range of
candidacy rules with diverse impacts.94 It is possible that the courts will
have little difficulty in restricting the Local 3489 rationale to only those
situations where the nature and effect of the candidacy rule in question is
almost identical to that involved in the instant case.9 5 In that event, the
courts would be free to return to their previous practice of construing
reasonableness according to whatever congressional purpose was deemed
predominant, without reference to uniform standards.96 This narrow reading
of the Local 3489 decision may allow the courts to invalidate virtually any
candidacy requirement in the name of the "public interest" in union
97
democracy.
Considered in toto, the Local 3489 decision represents a serious
departure from the balancing approach central to the LMRDA. The Court's
opinion appears to signify that henceforth the public interest in insuring
democratic union elections justifies the invalidation of any candidacy
requirement presumed "antidemocratic," irrespective of the countervailing
union interests it was intended to accommodate.98 It is submitted that this
imbalance was precisely what Congress sought to avoid by resorting to the
calculated ambiguity of including the word "reasonable" in the qualifications clause of section 401(e).9 9 Despite this ambiguity, those federal courts
94. Candidacy restrictions vary widely from union to union and from industry to
industry. Barnard, supra note 13, at 1241. Among the qualifications specified in union
constitutions are the following: timely payment of dues, length of membership, period
of employment in the industry, residency, citizenship, payment of qualifying fees,
meeting attendance, prior officeholding, no record of "scabbing," and membership in
the life insurance program administered by the union. Id. at 1241-42 & n.17. See also
29 C.F.R. § 452.37 (1976).
95. This narrow reading of Local 3489 will be encouraged if the courts apportion
equal weight to the answers to questions set forth in a recommended Department of
Labor test for evaluating candidacy rules:
(1) What has been the effect of the rule - does it make it easy or difficult to run
for office?
(2) What is the union's rationale for the rule and is this legitimate?
(3) Is the rule realistic in terms of the normal behavior and interests of the
union member?
(4) Does the rule serve some positive institutional need in terms of this
particular union or unions in general?
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, QUALIFICATIONs FOR UNION OFFICE, App. B, tables 8-12 (1970).
It should be noted that a court could easily find the meeting attendance rule involved
in Local 3489 unreasonable under this test, withoqt resort to the "statistical effects
test" employed by the Local 3489 Court.
96. See note 22 and accompanying text supra, This practice resulted in the
Supreme Court's consideration of the instant case.
97. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell warned that the majority's
"statistical effects test" could invalidate "almost any attendance requirement that
served legitimate union purposes." 429 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 308-14.
99. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.Commenting on the legislative
use of vague words like "reasonable," Judge Learned Hand observed that this practice
"really [grants] to courts ... a 'legislative' power, although we call the issues
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considering the scope of reasonableness under section 401(e) after Local 3489
should apply, consistent with the Secretary's current regulations, a true
"totality of circumstances" test in which the impact of a candidacy rule is
only one factor to be considered in assessing reasonableness. 100 Since the
Local 3489 Court appears to have adopted a per se approach that disdains a
"totality of circumstances" test, 01 whether the lower courts will be able to
employ such an analysis so as to reestablish an equitable balance between
union democracy, and self-government remains an open and serious
question.
The likely result of Local 3489 will be to create further inconsistency in
future judicial and union interpretations of the qualifications clause of
section 401(e). This uncertainty may force the Supreme Court to fashion a
more precise standard of reasonableness than it has heretofore considered
appropriate.
Charles D. Ossola
questions of fact." Yin-Shing Woo v. United States, 288 F.2d 434, 435 (2d Cir. 1961).

This responsibility requires of judges "the compromise that they think is in accord
with the general purposes of the measure as the community would understand it." Id.
Although Judge Hand was "of course aware of the resulting uncertainties involved in
such an interpretation," he pointed out that "the alternative would be specifically to
provide for each situation that can arise, a substitute utterly impractical in
operation." Id. The constitutional and functional role of courts "necessarily requires
the frequent application of judgment in the exercise of discretion." United States v.
Baker, 429 F.2d 1344, 1347 (7th Cir. 1970). The legislative process would "frequently
bog down if Congress were constitutionally required to appraise beforehand the
myriad situations to which it wishes a particular policy to be applied and to formulate
specific rules for each situation." American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
Thus, it is not necessary for Congress to supply administrative or judicial officials
with "a specific formula for their guidance in a field where flexibility and the
adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely variable conditions constitutes the
essence of the program." Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 294, 409
(1928).
100. See note 51 supra.
101. See notes 74-76 and accompanying text supra.
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